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Case No. 20050190-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State submits this brief 
in reply to new matters raised in respondent's brief. 
A. The magistrate misapprehended the bindover standard and 
misapplied it in light of the propr standard. 
Defendant's entire reply highlights his and the magistrate's misapprehension of the 
scope of the bindover standard and its proper application to the facts of this case. 
First, in defending the magistrate's refusal to bind her over, defendant misstates the 
bindover standard from State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 20 P.3d 300. Aple. Br. 6, 9-10, 12-13. 
Defendant correctly notes that in Clark there may have been both innocent and reasonably 
inculpatory inferences to be drawn from the defendants' conduct.1 Aple. Br. at 10. But then 
1
 Clark is the opinion of the consolidated appeals of two defendants, Clark and 
Smith, in two separate cases with similar facts. Clark, 2001 UT 9, \ 1. 
she repeatedly asserts that bindover is appropriate when "the only reasonable inferences 
support the State's case," clearly inferring that if reasonable inferences also support the 
defense the magistrate is not required to bind over. Aple. Br. at 6, 9-10, 12-13. Clark does 
not support defendant's new found proposition. Rather, Clark noted that although "one 
could infer that [the defendants' conduct stemmed from] otherwise legitimate transactions, 
this does not negate the reasonable inference that [the defendants' conduct was criminal or 
they knew their conduct was criminal]." Clark, 2001 UT 9, f^ 20. Thus, Clark held that 
"[v]iewing the evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable 
to the State, the State has shown probable cause [for bindover]." Id. As argued in the State's 
opening brief and hereinbelow, the proper application of this standard required the magistrate 
bind defendant over on the bad check charge (count II). Aplt. Br. at 20-24. 
Defendant next argues that "[t]he State . . . has ignore[d] the magistrate's 
Memorandum Decision, wherein the magistrate found that the so-called check should be 
regarded only as a promise to pay in the future, thereby taking this case out of the bad check 
statute." Aple. Br. at 7 (citing Memorandum Decision, R147). That argument stems from 
defendant's reliance on State v. Bruce, 1 Utah 2d 136,262 P.2d 960 (1953), which he asserts 
the State has also "wholly ignored." Id. These claims are not only unfounded and 
unrepresentative of the magistrate's findings, they also misapprehend the thrust of the State's 
argument. 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the magistrate did not find that the check failed to 
support a criminal charge because it was merely a promise to pay in future, but only that 
2 
defendant made that argument. R147. Rather, the magistrate recognized Bruce's observation 
that "the general rule [is] that a promise of performance in the future will usually not support 
a charge of fraud," see Bruce, 1 Utah 2d at 138-39, 262 P.2d at 962 (emphasis added), but 
then went on to write that under Bruce "the statute applied if there was a misrepresentation 
made at the time the [postdated] check was written." (Memorandum Decision, Rl 47) (citing 
Bruce, 1 Utah 2d at 139,262P.2dat962). Contrary to defendant's argument, the State noted 
the magistrate's comments in its opening brief, but limited its challenge to the magistrate's 
reliance on Bruce because the analysis in that case was skewed by the then-required element 
of fraud, no longer present in the current statute. Aplt. Br. at 17-19. Nevertheless, Bruce 
does stand for a proposition relevant to this case—the general rule, that a promise to pay in 
the future will not support a bad check charge, is nullified when a defendant knows the check 
will not be paid. 
In Bruce, the defendant wrote a worthless, postdated check for which he received 
titles to six used cars. 1 Utah 2d at 138,262 P.2d at 961. The court granted Bruce's motion 
to dismiss, and the State appealed. Id. The then- applicable bad check statute provided that 
"[a]ny person who . . . wilfully, with intent to defraud, makes . . . or delivers any check,.. 
. knowing at the time . . . that the maker . . . has not sufficient funds in, or credit with said 
bank... for the payment of such check,... is punishable " Bruce, 1 Utah 2d at 138,262 
P.2d at 961) (emphasis in original) (citing UTAH CODE ANN. 76-20-11 (1953)). Applying 
the statute to the postdated check, the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
3 
The emphasized words indicate that the statute denounces the passing 
of a bad check only where there is misrepresentation that the maker has money 
or credit at the time the bad check is passed. It logically follows that it does 
not apply when both maker and payee know that the check is postdated. Under 
such circumstances the clear inference is that the maker has not money to pay 
the check at the time, but intends to cover it by the postdate. Where the payee 
accepts it with that understanding, he is not relying on a representation that the 
maker has money in the bank at the time, but rather that it will be covered 
when it is presented on its date. This amounts to a promise to be performed 
in the future. Obviously such a promise may be made in good faith, but plans 
go awry, unexpected or uncontrollable events intervene, or a bona fide change 
of mind occurs, any one of which would negative the existence of an intent to 
defraud at the time the check was passed, thus eliminating an element essential 
to constitute the crime. Such reasoning is the basis of the general rule that a 
promise of performance in the future will usually not support a charge of 
fraud. 
1 Utah 2d at 138-39,262 P.2d at 962. Nevertheless, the court went on to state the following: 
Yet it should be here observed that we do not disagree with the 
contention of the State that the fact that a check is postdated is not necessarily, 
under all circumstances, an absolute defense to a criminal charge for making 
and passing it. 
It is conceivable that the evidence may show facts sufficient to demonstrate 
beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time the check was made the maker did 
so "wilfully, with intent to defraud . . . .". 
We conclude that in spite of the difficulty in proving a present existing intent 
to defraud where the check is postdated, if the payee acting reasonably accepts 
the check as one of current date, and the facts would support a finding beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant ". . . wilfully, with intent to defraud . . 
." passes a worthless check, the question of his guilt of the crime should be 
submitted to a jury. 
1 Utah 2d at 138-40, 262 P.2d at 962-63 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. 76-20-11 (1953)). 
4 
Based on the foregoing principles, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's 
granting Bruce's motion to dismiss. 1 Utah 2d at 141, 262 P.2d at 963-64. The court 
recounted that "defendant's account had been closed, that he had had no money in the bank 
for over a month and that checks had been returned to him unpaid," and stated, "[t]hose facts, 
taken by themselves, would indeed seem very persuasive as to the defendant's fraudulent 
design at the time the check was passed." 1 Utah 2d at 141,262 P.2d at 963. Evidence that 
the victim knew that Bruce was relying on the titles to secure financing to cover the check, 
however, gave rise to "a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt." 1 Utah 2d at 141, 262 
P.2dat964. 
Although Bruce interpreted a statute quite different from the current bad check statute, 
its discussion undercuts both defendant's argument and the magistrate's findings. First, 
Bruce explicitly rejects the inviolability of the principle that future promises to pay, in 
whatever form they take, will not support a bad check charge.2 
Second, the distinction in the standards applicable to the motions to dismiss in Bruce 
and Clark highlight the magistrate's error in this case. The Bruce court evidently considered 
a motion to dismiss following the State's case-in-chief at trial. 1 Utah 2d at 140, 262 P.2d 
at 963. The governing standard then and now was "that upon [a motion to dismiss] the 
evidence is to be viewed most favorably to the state, and if when so viewed, the jury acting 
2
 Defendant also argues that the State "wholly ignore[d]"] Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, 
565 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1977). Aple. Br. at 7. He neglects to mention that the magistrate 
also ignored Howells with respect to count II. In any case, the State's argument, above, 
relying on Bruce for the view that a check constituting a promise to pay in the future is 
not necessarily void, renders Howells superfluous. 
5 
fairly and reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt " State 
v. Iverson, 10 Utah 2d 171, 173, 350 P.2d 152, 153 (1960) (emphasis added); State v. 
Montoya, 2004 UT 5,1j 29, 84 P.3d 1183. Here, by contrast, defendant's motion to dismiss 
must be considered in light of the standard for bindover. The standard necessary to support 
a finding of probable cause for a bindover (the same as that for obtaining an arrest warrant) 
is distinctively lower than that required to send a case to the jury. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 16. 
For bindover, the prosecution need only present "sufficient evidence to support a reasonable 
belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." Id. 
(emphasis added). See State v. Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, ^  19 (recognizing the distinction 
between bindover and directed verdict standards). 
The evidence in this case was comparable to that which the Bruce court found "very 
persuasive as to [Bruce's] fraudulent design at the time the check was passed": in the two 
and one-half years ending July, 2002, defendant and her husband had passed 254 bad checks, 
had at least fourteen bank accounts of which only one existed for more than one or two years, 
had eleven of the twelve accounts examined by the State's investigator involuntarily closed 
by the defendants' banks, and owed approximately $450,000 to about twenty persons and 
entities. R196:8-10; State's Ex. 3.3 Further, unlike the victim in Bruce, Morris Murdock's 
3
 Defendant asserts that "[a]s the record shows, the Wallaces have in fact fulfilled 
most of their obligations, although some took longer than expected. Aple. Br. at 12. This 
assertion is unsupported by any record citation. It would also appear to be inaccurate. 
Toby O'Bryant, the State's investigator, testified that defendants' admitted to him that the 
State's "Restitution/Victim List," listing their indebtedness in the amount of $457,379.79, 
was "fairly accurate." R196:30-32; State's Ex. 3. 
6 
agent had no additional information that would have supported any doubt she might have had 
about defendant's promise that the check would be good on the following Tuesday. Thus, 
given "very persuasive" comparable evidence in this case and the lower burdens of proof 
required for bindover than that applicable in Bruce, the magistrate should have bound 
defendant over. 
The foregoing conclusion is buttressed by this Court's decision in State v. Virgin, 
2004 UT App 251, 1f 20, 96 P.3d 379 ("[S]o long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops.") (citations omitted) (brackets in original), cert 
granted, 106 P.3d 743. Virgin was charged with aggravated sexual abuse, which was based 
only on the four-year-old victim's inconsistent reports, unsubstantiated by any physical 
evidence. Id. at fflf 2-8,14. On appeal from the magistrate's refusal to bind Virgin over, this 
Court agreed with the State that, in spite of the paucity of evidence, "there [was] sufficient 
evidence, although perhaps barely, to support a reasonable belief that [defendant touched 
[his victim] with the requisite intent.. . ." Id. at j^ 20. 
Here, the magistrate failed to view the prosecution's evidence of defendant's 
substantial history of writing bad checks, closed bank accounts, and accumulating debt 
favorably to the State; that is, to recognize the reasonable inference from the evidence that 
defendant would have been reasonably certain that her check would not be paid on within 
a few days. See Bruce, 1 Utah 2d at 141, 262 P.2d at 963. Cf. State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 
603,604-05 (Utah 1985) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence 
7 
of other bad checks because such evidence went to intent). Instead, the magistrate focused 
only on the prosecution's failure to specifically rebut defendant's "representation" that she 
was expecting a substantial amount of money from an investment. R147-46. Under Virgin, 
however, even if the magistrate viewed the prosecution's evidence as only "barely" 
sufficient, he was required to bind defendant over. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 10 ("At [the 
bindover] stage of the proceeding, 'the evidence required [to show probable cause] . . . is 
relatively low because the assumption is that the prosecution's case will only get stronger as 
the investigation continues.'") (second set of brackets in original) (citations omitted). In fact, 
in the absence of any genuine countermanding evidence, there was more than ample evidence 
to support "a reasonable belief that defendant knew the check would not be paid. 
B. Defendant's argument that the check is not a "check" under 
the Uniform Commercial Code is raised for the first time on appeal; 
even if defendant's insufficient-funds check is not a "check," 
it is an actionable "draft" under the bad check statute. 
Defendant argues that under UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-104 (West 2004), her 
insufficient-funds check to Morris Murdock is not a "check" at all. Aple. Br. at 7-8.4 
"Therefore," defendant continues, "the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support 
a reasonable belief that [she] issued or passed a check, an essential element of section 76-5-
505(1)." M a t 8. 
"Generally, absent exceptional circumstances or plain error, a party who fails to bring 
an issue to the trial court's attention is barred from asserting it on appeal." Brigham City v. 
4
 Statutes cited are attached at Addendum A. 
8 
Stuart, 2002 UT App 317, \ 14, 57 P.3d 1111 (citation omitted), affd, 2005 UT 13,122 P.3d 
506, cert, granted, 126 S.Ct. 979 (2006). 
Here, defendant did not draw the magistrate's attention to the claim that her 
insufficient-funds check was not a "check," as contemplated by section 70A-3-104 or any 
other provision of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, and that as a consequence it was not 
actionable under section 76-6-505(1). This Court should, therefore, decline to consider it.5 
5
 Any resort to Howells to argue that defendant preserved a challenge to the check 
as a "check" should be rejected. Defendant has quoted Howells in her memorandum in 
support of her motion to dismiss, her reply to the State's opposition memorandum, and on 
appeal, as follows: "The law is that where the maker and payee are aware that there are 
not funds presently available to pay a check and it is therefore post-dated, or agreed to be 
held, it does not come within the definition of a check, which must be payable on 
demand, but is properly regarded as a promise to pay in the future." R103-102, 127; Aplt. 
Br. at 7-8 (all citing Howells, 565 P.2d at 1149-50). In each of those instances, defendant 
drew the magistrate's attention only to the check's failure as a promise of future payment 
and not to its insufficiency as a "check." Id. Accordingly, the magistrate neither opined 
nor ruled on whether the insufficient-funds check was a "check." R147-146. 
In any event, any suggestion based on Howells, that the check was not a "check" 
because it was agreed that it would be held, and was therefore "postdated" and thus not 
payable on demand, fails under the facts of this case. Here, the check was actually 
predated "July 17," one day before defendant gave it to Morris Murdock's for the tickets 
to Hawaii. Rl96:49. Although Howells states that verbal notice that a check is to be held 
is equivalent to postdating a check, see Howells, 565 P.2d at 1149-50, more recent law 
indicates otherwise: "[A]n instrument's negotiability must be determinable from what 
appears on its face and without reference to extrinsic facts, . . . This requirement protects 
transferees from latent defenses to payment, i.e., those defenses which are not readily 
apparent from the document. Calfo v. D.C. Stewart Co., Ill P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1986) 
(citing Official Comments to U.C.C. § 3-105 and 5 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code 
§ 3-104:4 (3d ed. 1984)) (other citations omitted) (emphasis added). Similarly,UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 70A-3-106 (1) (West 2004), states: "Except as provided in this section, for 
the purposes of Subsection 70A-3-104 (1), a promise or order is unconditional unless it 
states an express condition to payment, that the promise or order is subject to or governed 
by another writing, or that rights or obligations with respect to the promise or order are 
stated in another writing." Id. (emphasis added). In short, any inference under Howells 
that defendant's predated check was actually not immediately negotiable and payable on 
9 
Even assuming, however, that the check was not a "check" under Howe lis or section 70 A-3-
104 (6), as defendant argues, it was still actionable under the bad check statute as a draft. 
Defendant's insufficient-funds "check" is indisputably a draft, also actionable under 
Section 76-6-505.6 "An instrument... is a 'draft5 if is an order." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-
3-104 (5) (West 2004).7 An "'[instrument' means a negotiable instrument." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 70A-3-104 (2) (West 2004). It was never disputed that the "check" made out to 
Morris Murdock was in the form of a check. R147. Thus, it was undisputed that the 
"check," was an "order." It also necessarily follows from the formality of the "check" that 
it was a negotiable instrument: The check was "an unconditional promise or order to pay a 
fixed amount of money . . . payable to [Morris Murdock] . . . at the time it [was] issued, 
. . . at a definite time[,] and [it did] not state any other undertaking or instruction by the 
[defendant] . . . to do any act in addition to the payment of money " See Utah Code Ann. 
demand fails in light of more recent law. 
6
 Section 76-6-505 provides: 
Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the 
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad 
check or draft. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-505 (1) (West 2004) (emphasis added). 
7
 Section 70A-3-104 (5) provides: "An instrument is a 'note5 if it is a promise 
and is a 'draft' if it is an order." 
10 
§ 70A-3-104 (1) (West 2004).8 Thus, the "check" was a "draft"—a negotiable instrument, 
which was undisputably payable at a definite time, i.e., the next Tuesday, July 23, 2002, at 
which time defendant promised payment. Rl96:48-49. Therefore, even if defendant is 
correct, that her "check" is not actionable under Howells and section 70A-3-104 (6) because 
it was not payable on demand, it is nevertheless actionable as a draft. 
The foregoing syllogism is supported by the cases. "[A] postdated check negotiated 
prior to its date is not a 'check' . . . because it is not payable on demand. It is, instead, a 
'draft.'" In re J.LC Installations, Inc., 109 B.R. 43, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying 
definitions in N.Y.U.C.C Law §§ 3-104 (2)(a)-(b)) (McKinney 1964) (other citations 
omitted). "[A] 'draft [is a] written order by the first party, called the drawer, instructing a 
second party, called the drawee (such as a bank), to pay a third party, called the payee.'" 
Childers v. State, 813 N.E.2d 432, 436 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting BLACK'S LAW 
8
 Section 70A-3-104 (1) provides: 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (3) and (4), "negotiable instrument" 
means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, 
with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, 
if it: 
(a) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into 
possession of a holder; 
(b) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and 
(c) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person 
promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the 
payment of money . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-104 (1) (West 2004) (emphasis added). 
11 
DICTIONARY 258 (abridged 5th ed. 1983)). "A draft is a three-party instrument whereby the 
drawer orders the drawee to pay money to the payee. See J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, 
Uniform Commercial Code § 13-1 (2d ed. 1980). A draft is also called a check when the 
drawee is a bank and the instrument is payable on demand." Tepper By and Through 
Michelson v. Citizens Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n., 448 So.2d 1138, 1140 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1984) (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. §673.104(2)(b) (West 1966)). "To be a check the instrument 
must be a draft drawn on a bank and made payable on demand A draft is an order to pay 
a sum certain in money, signed by the drawer, payable on demand or at a definite time, and 
to order or bearer." People v. Norwood, 103 Cal. Rptr. 7,11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (citing Cal. 
Com. §§3104 (1), -(2) (a)-(b) (West 1964)). 
In short, a draft is a check except that it is not payable on demand, but only at a definite time. 
Other courts have the defendants those cases guilty under their bad check statutes for 
issuing insufficient-funds drafts that did not qualify as checks. See Childers, 813 N.E.2d at 
436 (holding that dishonored "comchecks," drawn on a commercial entity other than a bank, 
were an actionable "form of drafts other than checks"); People v. Bercovitz, 126 P. 479,480 
(Cal. 1912) (holding that even assuming the postdated check was not a "check" within the 
meaning of the statute, it was a "draft," similarly prohibited by the statute). In light of these 
authorities and the foregoing analysis, this Court too should conclude that even if defendant's 
check was not a "check," it nevertheless was an actionable draft under the bad check statute. 
12 
C. The magistrate incorrectly concluded that 
there was insufficient evidence to bind defendant over. 
Defendant argues that the "[t]he State produced believable evidence that Wallace 
rightfully believed that there would be sufficient funds to cover the 'check'; however, the 
state produced no evidence that Wallace believed that there would be insufficient funds to 
cover the 'check.'" Aple. Br. at 9-14. 
Contrary to defendant's argument and the magistrate's finding, the State presented far 
more evidence than insufficient funds and a failure to pay. Defendant reargues the error that 
the magistrate made, that the State was required to show that defendant misrepresented that 
she was expecting a large sum of money to make the check good. But that is not what the 
statute requires. Rather, given the standard at the bindover stage, the State was required to 
show that defendant was "reasonably certain" that the check would not be paid. This the 
State has demonstrated far beyond the fact that defendant had insufficient funds and failed 
to pay; that is, based on the repeated failures of their business enterprises, evidenced by their 
passing 259 bad checks in the preceding two and one-half years, during which they accrued 
an unresolved debt of almost half a million dollars and where there was no evidence other 
than defendants' self-serving, unsubstantiated statements that they were expecting money, 
defendant and her husband George could only have been reasonably certain that the check 
to Morris Murdock would not be paid. Aplt. Br. at 20-25. Defendant compounds his 
misunderstanding by attempting to rebut the foregoing facts by inaccurately stating that "[a]s 
the record shows, the Wallaces have in fact fulfilled most of their obligations, although some 
took longer than expected. Aple. Br. at 12. 
13 
Defendant's assertion that the State "switched" the burden to her to show that she was 
indeed expecting sufficient funds to cover the check misstates the State's argument. Aplt. 
Br. at 20-21. It also highlights the magistrate's error that "there was ample evidence at the 
preliminary hearing that the [Wallaces] were expecting to receive a substantial amount of 
money from an investment and there was no evidence presented by the State contrary to this 
representation." The State's reference to the Wallaces' failure to proffer any evidence that 
they were expecting a large sum of money was made simply to highlight that indeed there 
was no evidence of that fact. Aplt. Br. at 21. The kernel of the State's argument, as set out 
in its opening brief, is that there was no believable evidence that defendant was expecting 
substantial funds, but that there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that 
defendant would have been "reasonably certain," that there would not be enough money in 
the account to cover the check to Morris Murdock. Id. 
From her misunderstanding of the bindover standard, defendant proceeds to argue that 
"the only evidence the State presented regarding [defendant's] mental state was [from] Ms. 
Warner, [who] testified that [defendant] believed she would have funds by the following 
Tuesday to cover the 'check' made out on July 18." Aple. Br. at 11. However, even if such 
unsupported "evidence"—the same tired, self-serving expression of unfulfilled expectation 
that defendant had repeatedly used to put off the Wallaces' other creditors—had any weight, 
it did not "negate the reasonable inference" that defendant would have been reasonably 
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certain that the check would not be paid the next Tuesday.9 Clark, 2001 UT 9, \ 20 . As 
argued in the State's opening brief, evidence of defendants' history of writing hundreds of 
bad checks in the preceding two years, involuntary bank account closures, and a huge 
unsatisfied debt, alongside unfulfilled promises to repay their creditors, amply showed that 
defendant would have been reasonably certain that the check to Morris Murdock would not 
be paid by the following Tuesday. Aplt. Br. at 22-25. 
Based on the same misunderstanding of the bindover standard, also reflected in the 
magistrate's analysis, defendant argues that "the State asserts that the magistrate should 
ignore the fact that Wallace believed she would be receiving sufficient money to cover the 
"check" issued to Morris Murdock Travel." Aple. Br. at 13 (citing Aplt. Br. at 21). As 
noted, however, it is defendant who ignores that there was no evidence that defendants were 
truly expecting to receive "a big amount" of money," but merely that Ms. Warner testified 
that that was what defendant repeatedly told her. R196:50-51. 
Similarly, defendant also challenges the State's argument that the magistrate's duty 
to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution means that he should ignore 
"reasonable inferences favoring the defense," such as Ms. Warner's testimony. Aple. Br. at 
9
 After failing to timely repay Mr. Martinez's and Mr. Horton's loans by September 1, 
2001, long before writing the check to Morris Murdock, defendants, week after week, told 
Martinez and Horton that they expected a "big deal" to come through and that "[w]e should 
have your money for you by this next Tuesday or Wednesday." R196:37-38. Defendant 
gave them the same story when she wrote checks later returned for insufficient funds as 
defendants were leaving for Hawaii. R296:41-42. Similarly, defendant put off the 
Stonelys for months with promises of performance, while she and her husband repeatedly 
missed or sent short payments on the house for months and years afterward. See State's 
Ex. 2, Ex. I 
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13-14. That assertion misrepresents the State's argument. Rather, the State argued that the 
magistrate should not have attached any significance to defendant's claim that she expected 
to receive money because of "the paucity of such evidence." Aplt. Br. at 21. That argument 
clearly implied that the magistrate could ignore such evidence when, in light of the State's 
opposing evidence, it was so minimal. Here again, defendant, as did the magistrate, refuses 
to accept the prosecution's limited evidentiary burden in this case— that at the bindover 
stage "[t]he magistrate must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." Clark, 
2001 UT 9, K 10 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original). See 
also State v. Hawatrneh, 2001 UT 51, f^ 3, 26 P.3d 223 (magistrate must "resolve all 
inferences in favor of the prosecution") "[W]hen faced with conflicting evidence, the 
magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence... but must leave those tasks to the fact finder 
at trial." Clark, 2001 UT 9, |^ 10 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration 
in original). Applying that standard to the facts of this case, with the reasonable presumption 
that the prosecution's case would only grow stronger as the investigation continued, the 
magistrate should have bound defendant over on the bad check charge (count II). 
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CONCLUSION 
The magistrate's order refusing to bind defendant over and dismissing the felony 
information against defendant on a charge of issuing a bad check (count 2) should be 
reversed and the case remanded for entry of an order binding defendant over for trial on that 
charge. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this lf_ day of March, 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
x
 KENNETH BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Utah Code Ann, (West 2004) 
§ 70A-3 -104 . Negotiable instrument 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (3) and (4), "negotiable instrument" 
means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with 
or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it: 
(a) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes 
into possession of a holder; 
(b) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and 
(c) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person 
promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of 
money, but the promise or order may contain: 
(i) an undertaking or power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to 
secure payment; 
(ii) an authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment or 
realize on or dispose of collateral; or 
(iii) a waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or 
protection of an obligor. 
(2) "Instrument" means a negotiable instrument. 
(3) An order that meets all of the requirements of Subsection (1), except 
Subsection (l)(a), and otherwise falls within the definition of "check" in 
Subsection (6) is a negotiable instrument and a check. 
(4) A promise or order other than a check is not an instrument if, at the time 
it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder, it contains a conspicuous 
statement, however expressed, to the effect that the promise or order is not 
negotiable or is not an instrument governed by this chapter. 
(5) An instrument is a "note" if it is a promise and is a "draft" if it is an 
order. If an instrument falls within the definition of both "note" and "draft," a 
person entitled to enforce the instrument may treat it as either. 
(6)(a) "Check" means: 
, (i) a draft, other than a documentary draft, payable on demand and 
drawn on a bank; 
(ii) a cashier's check or teller's check; or 
(iii) a demand draft, 
(b) An instrument may be a check even though it is described on its face by 
another term, such as "money order." 
(7) "Cashier's check" means a draft with respect to which the drawer and 
drawee are the same bank or branches of the same bank. 
(8) "Teller's check" means a draft drawn by a bank either on another bank, 
or payable at or through a bank. 
(9) "Traveler's check" means an instrument that: 
(a) is payable on demand; 
(b) is drawn on or payable at or through a bank; 
(c) is designated by the term "traveler's check" or by a substantially 
similar term; and 
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 (d) requires, as a condition to payment, a countersignature by a person 
J
 whose specimen signature appears on the instrument. 
- (10) ''Certificate of deposit" means an instrument containing an acknowledg-
ment by a bank that a sum of money has been received by the bank and a 
promise by the bank to repay the sum of money. A certificate of deposit is a 
note of the bank. 
( l l ) (a) "Demand draft" means a writing not signed by a customer that is 
created by a third party under the purported authority of the customer for the 
purpose of charging the customer's account with a bank, 
(b) A demand draft: 
(i) shall contain the customer's account number; 
(ii) may contain any or all of the following: 
(A) the customer's printed or typewritten name; 
(B) a notation that the customer authorized the draft; or 
(C) the statement "No Signature Required" or words to that effect; 
and 
(iii) may not include a check purportedly drawn by and bearing the 
signature of a fiduciary, as defined in Section 70A-3-307. 
Laws 1993, c. 237, § 29; Laws 1998, c. 60, § 2, eff. July 1, 1998. 
§ 70A-3—106. Unconditional promise or order 
(1) Except as provided in this section, for the purposes of Subsection 
70A-3-104 (1), a promise or order is unconditional unless it states an express 
condition to payment, that the promise or order is subject to or governed by 
another writing, or that rights or obligations with respect to the promise or 
order are stated in another writing. A reference to another writing does not of 
itself make the promise or order conditional. 
(2) A promise or order is not made conditional by a reference to another 
writing for a statement of rights with respect to collateral, prepayment, or 
acceleration, or because payment is limited to resort to a particular fund or 
source. 
(3) If a promise or order requires, as a condition to payment, a countersigna-
ture by a person whose specimen signature appears on the promise or order, 
the condition does not make the promise or order conditional for the purposes 
of Subsection 70A-3-104 (1). If the person whose specimen signature appears 
on an instrument fails to countersign the instrument, the failure to countersign 
is a defense to the obligation of the issuer, but the failure does not prevent a 
transferee of the instrument from becoming a holder of the instrument. 
(4) If a promise or order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession 
of a holder contains a statement, required by applicable statutory or adminis-
trative law, to the effect that the rights of a holder or transferee are subject to 
claims or defenses that the issuer could assert against the original payee, the 
promise or order is not thereby made conditional for the purposes of Subsec-
tion 70A-3-104 (1). However, if the promise or order is an instrument, there 
cannot be a holder in due course of the instrument 
Laws 1993, c. 237, § 31. 
Cal . Com. (West 1964) 
§ 3 1 0 4 . Form of Negotiable Instruments; "Draft"; "Check"; 
"Certificate of Deposit"; "Note". (1) Any. writing to be a negotiable 
instrument within this division must 
(a) Be signed by the maker or drawer; and 
(b) Contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum cer-
tain in money and no other promise, order, obligation or power given 
by the maker or drawer except as authorized by this division; and 
(c) Be payable on demand or at a definite time; and 
(d) Be payable to order or to bearer. 
(2) A writing which complies with the requirements of this sec-
tion is 
(a) A "draft" ("bill of exchange") if it is an order; 
(b) A "check" if it is a draft drawn on a bank and payable on 
demand; 
(c) A "certificate of deposit" if it is" an acknowledgment by a 
bank of receipt of money with an engagement to repay it; 
(d) A."note" if it is a promise other than a certificate of deposit. 
(3) As used in other divisions of this code, and as the context 
may require, the terms "draft," "check," "certificate of deposit" and 
"note" may refer to instruments which are not negotiable within this 
division as well as to instruments which are so negotiable. (Stats. 
1963, c. 819, § 3104.) 
F l a . S t a t . Ann. (West 1966) 
673.3-104 Form of negotiable instruments; "draft"; 
"check"; "certificate of deposit"; "note" 
(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this 
chapter must : 
(a) Be signed by the maker or drawer; and 
(b) Contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum 
certain in money and no other promise, order, obligation 
or power given by the* maker or drawer except asaau-
-^ thor i zed by this chapter; and 
(c)»Be payable on demand or at a definite time; and 
^ (d) B§ payable to order or to bearer. 
. jp2)* A Writing which complies with the requirements of this 
s^Qtion f&Y-
( a £ A/ 'drafT ("bill of exchange") if it is an order; 
(b) A^'check" if it is a draft drawn on a bank and^payable 
*
1%i
 on demand^ 
(c)uA "certificate of deposit" if it,is an acknowledgment by 
S " a banS'of receipt of money with an engagement to repay 
(fifJrAVnote" J t it is, a promise omer man a cerancaie 01 
- deposit/*;? 
(3) As used in other chapters of this code, and as the., context 
may. require^the terms "draft", "check", "certificate ofv deposit" 
and "note" ;jnay refer to instruments which are" not negotiable 
within this* chapter as well as to. instruments Which 'ardFso negb-
N.Y.U.C.C. Law (McKinney 1964) 
§ 3 — 1 0 4 . Form of ] Negotiable Instruments; "urait"; 
"Check"; "Certificate of Deposit"; "Note" 
(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this 
Article must 
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and 
(b) ^contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum 
r l
 ~ certain in money and no other promise, order, obliga-
tion or power given by the maker or drawer except as 
authorized by this Article; and 
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and 
(d) be payable to order or to bearer. 
(2) A writing which complies with the requirements of this 
section is 
(a) a "draft" ("bill of exchange") if it is an order; 
(b) a "check" if it is a draft drawn on a bank and payable 
on demand; 
r(c), a "certificate of deposit" if it is an acknowledgment 
by a bank of receipt of money with an engagement to 
repay it; 
(&)' a "note" if it is a promise other than a certificate of 
deposit. 
(3)/As used in other Articles of this Act, and as the context 
may require, the terms "draft", "check", "certificate of deposit" 
and "note" may refer to instruments which are not negotiable 
within this Article as well as to instruments which are so ne-
gotiable.^ L.1962, c. 553, eff. Sept. 27,1964. 
